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FAMILY LAW
GEORGE J. ALEXANDER
The most important events of this year in family law concerned
divorce. In the wake of an Alabama decision, New York litigants waited
anxiously to see whether the rule which barred later collateral attack by
parties to a foreign divorce had been swept away. The issue was before
the courts, but only forecasts of the answer were available. Another out
of-state divorce, that by the governor's wife, brought a storm of protest
against the New York divorce law.

Aside from these events, the Family

Court Act was passed as part of the court reorganization scheme. I t, also,
promised considerable change.
I

MATRIMONIAL ACTIONS

Marriage and Annulment.-A rather touching case is presented in
the application of Honore E. Kiellman1 in which the petitioner, "a lady
now past

50

years of age," requested permission for her fourth venture

into matrimony despite an injunction dating from the termination of her
first marriage presumably on statutory grounds. 2 The lady in question,
now more concerned about the injunction than she was in her last two
marriages which were performed out of state, requested modification of
the decree to allow a new alliance.

Departing from the uncharitable

standard of Spinks v. Spinks,3 the court found the two out-of-state mar
riages not inconsistent with the "uniformly good" conduct4 standard to be
applied on applications of this sort.

Finding it unnecessary to make a

determination of petitioner'S morality, and finding the moral issue satis
factorily settled anyway, since she attached "a Latin document signed by
the Chancery of her church" attesting to the valid dissolution of her prior
marriages,!; the court granted the motion. According to Justice Brenner,
the statutory good conduct standard merely requires that the conduct in
the period under consideration should be such as not to "break down the
institution of marriage."o) Applying that standard, Justice Brenner con
cluded that "provided she does not molest an already married man, she
may, through successive marriages, conceivably promote the institution of
marriage."7 The injunction against remarriage is, as a practical matter,
George J. Alexander is Assistant Professor of Law at the Syracuse University College
of Law and a Member of the Illinois and New York Bars.
1. Kiellman v. Kiellman, 28 Misc. 2d 717, 216 N.Y.S.2d 197 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1961).
2. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § Il47.
3. 43 N.Y.S.2d 418 (Sup. Ct., Bronx Co. 1943).
4. N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law § 8.
5. 28 Misc. 2d at 719, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 199.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
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unenforceable;

out-of-state marriages are recognized as valid although

consumated in violation ot injunctive provisions.s

In the context of

these legal facts, a graver approach to the problem seems unwarranted.
Annulments are still being liberally awarded,9 as contrasted with the
harshness of single-ground divorce decrees.

There are, of course, limi

tations. Although it is clear that fraud as to the mental health of one of
the parties to the marriage may be sufficient ground for an annulment,to
it has not been clear since Smith v. Smith!! how much candor is required
with respect to the immediate relatives of the parties. Facing that prob
lem, the court in Hameister v. Hameister,12 ruled that concealment as to
the mental condition of "V's mother was insufficient grounds for annulment.
An action to annual a marriage on the ground of fraud was com
menced by a party who died during the period between the interlocutory
and final judgments.

Considering the survival of such an action, the

fourth department held that Section

1139

of the Civil Practice Act de·

manded the entry of the final judgment as a matter of course, consequently
disinheriting the ex-wife.13
of Section

82

In light of the survival of action provisions

of the Civil Practice Act, when read with Section

1139

which

allows an action to annul a marriage on the ground of fraud by relatives
after the death of a party to the marriage, the decision seems sound. The
opposite holding would merely require substituting the relatives of the
decedent in the same action, a formality, which, after the issuance of the
interlocutory judgment, seems unnecessary.
Finally, Shepetin v. Shepetin14 held that failure to have sexual inter
course, although a ground for separation when willful,!5 is not otherwise
a ground. Since separation actions are authorized only for a specifed list
of misconducts,16 a refusal to order separation for unwilled abstinence
seems correct. Assuming that the impotence to which the court refers did
not pre-exist the marriage, H & W are remanded to their sexless marriage,
since annulment, under those circumstances, is also unavailable.17
Divorce.-Two actions of great potential affect on New York divorce
law were occasioned by New York residents in other states. The governor's
wife duplicated the pilgrimage taken by many of her husband's con
stituents18 and procured an order terminating her marriage.19 The imme8. Thorpe v. Thorpe, 90 N.Y. 602 (1882).
9. See, e.g., Annulment of Marriage in New York for Fraud Based upon Religious
Factors, 30 Fordham L. Rev. 776 (1962).
10. Goldsmith v. Goldsmith, 279 App. Div. 579, 107 N.Y.S.2d 691 (1st Dep't 1951).
11. 112 Misc. 371, 184 N.Y. Supp. 134 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1920).
12. 28 Misc. 2d 796, 216 N.Y.S.2d 436 (Sup. Ct., Herkimer Co. 1961).
13. Matter of Estate of Haney, 14 App. Div. 2d 121, 217 N.Y.S.2d 324 (4th Dep't 1961).
14. 16 App. Div. 2d 948, 229 N.Y.S.2d 457 (2d Dep't 1962).
15. Diemer v. Diemer, 8 N.Y.2d 206, 168 N.E.2d 654, 203 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1960).
16. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1161.
17. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 49 N.Y.S.2d 314 (Sup. Ct., Bronx Co. 1944).
18. Some concept of the volume is afforded in an excellent book published this
year. Blake, The Road to Reno, at 171 (1962).
19. N.Y. Times, March 17, 1962, p. 1, col. 2.
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diate reaction to her action was public recoil from the archaic New York
2 The other notable
provisions which presumably occasioned the journey. 0
e.xcursion was taken by the Hartigans to Alabama in order to contest
modification of a previous divorce decree. In the aftermath of their case,21
in which the court on its own motion vacated the original divorce on the
ground of the fraudulent claim of Alabama residence, the law of New
York has been in some turmoil. The intervening year and a half since that
decision has produced no reported case in this state taking a definitive
position on the relationship of that ruling to previously settled principles.
Before the case, parties to an action for divorce were barred from denying
its validity in this state, when they were personally represented in the prior
action.22 It is, of course, still true that where the appearance of one of
the parties in the foreign divorce was procured through fraud or coercion,
estoppel does not apply. 32 Facing the problem more squarely, two courts
have suggested alternative accommodations. In Sommer v. Sommer,24 the
appellate division affirmed the dismissal of a declaratory judgment action
seeking invalidation of an Alabama decree, but added the sage suggestion
that petitioner "may be able to obtain similar or related relief in another
jurisdiction."25 In Bard v. Bard,26 a similar action seeking a declaration
of the invalidity of an Alabama divorce, the court refused W's motion to
dismiss on procedural grounds but added, "moreover, even if the plaintiff
voluntarily appeared in the divorce action, it may be that the holding in
v. Boxer
. . and similar cases will have to be re-examined in the
light of Hartigan v. Hartigan . . . "21

Boxer

.

.

The prediction of the Bard case seems well founded. Boxer v. Boxer2s
relied primarily on Sherrer v. Sherrer,29 which bars collateral attack on a
judgment of a sister state when such attack is not open to citizens of the
sister state.

Shen-er merely limits the extent of collateral challenge per

missible; it does not require that any be allowed. Consequently, it would
be open to New York to retain the Boxer rule for different reasons. Since
20. See, e.g., editorial, Divorce Law Fictions, N.Y. Times, March 17, 1962, p. 24, col. 2.
For a more definitive attack, unrelated to the incident i n question, see Blake, The Road
to Reno (1962).
21. Hartigan v. Hartigan, 272 Ala. 67, 128 So. 2d 725 (1961).
22. Boxer v. Boxer, 7 App. Div. 2d 1001, 184 N.Y.S.2d 303 (2d Dep't), alI'd, 7 N.Y.2d
781, 163 N.E.2d 149, 194 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1959).
23. Bard v. Bard, 16 App. Div. 2d 801, 228 N.Y.S.2d 294 (2d Dep't 1962).
2·1. 16 App. Div. 2d 629, 226 N.Y .s.2d 730 (1st Dep't 1962).
25. Id. at 629, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 731. On remand, special term refused to consider the
effect of the Hartigan decision, holding that matter to have been settled by the appellate
division's affirmance of the dismissal of the declaratory judgment action. Sommer v.
Sommer, 232 N.Y.S.2d 558 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1962).
26. 29 Misc. 2d 453, 219 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1961), alI'd, 16 App.
Div. 2d 801, 228 N.Y.S.2d 294 (2d Dep't 1962).
27. Id. at 454, 219 N.y.s.2d at 494.
28. 7 App. Div. 2d 1001, 184 N.Y.S.2d 303 (2d Dep't), alI'd, 7 N.Y.2d 781, 163
N.E.2d 149, I!H N.Y.S.2d 47 (1959).
29. 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
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Alabama has become a notorious divorce haven, however, it is not unlikely
that the court will adopt a rule sanctioning collateral attack by a spouse
in a New York proceeding despite his participation in the Alabama action.
The impact of the case will primarily crush those who have relied on pre
existing law. It is to be assumed that the ultimate effect of the case, unless
other states adopt the Hartigan rule, will be merely to divert the divorce
business from Alabama to, for example, Nevada. The practical effect on
parties previously "divorced" in Alabama is yet one more result of a divorce
law incompatible with national mores.

Another shocking spawn of the

same law is Sackler v. Sackler30 more fully discussed in this Survey in the
evidence section, in which the appellate division felt compelled to allow
introduction of evidence of adultery procured by H in an unlawful entry
of W's residence.

It is little wonder that, in a state in which a method

of obtaining judicial approbation for a divorce consists of battering down
doors with allies who can testify to W's indiscretion, out-of-state divorces
have become a normal modus operandi.
Mexican divorces were also being challenged. In Busk v. Busk31 the
court held that irrespective of the validity of a Mexican divorce terminat
ing a second marriage, such a decree could not validate an otherwise in
valid Mexican mail-order divorce for H's first marriage.

Recognizing the

rule of Statter v. Statter,32 that a valid adjudication of separation includes
an adjudication of the validity of the prior marriage, the court, nonethe
less, held such principle inapplicable to Mexican divorces.
II

SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ALIMONY

Separation Agreements.-This year a number of separation agreements
proved themselves more perdurable than expected.

Following the Court

of Appeals mandate in Borax v. Borax,33 which barred a judicial action
for separation during the pendency of a valid separation agreement, a
court had little difficulty in dismissing an action by W, party to such an
agreement, to the extent that it sought separation.34
understandably,

to read the standard

separation

The court refused,

agreement

provision.

that the terms of the contract may be incorporated into a judgment of
separation or divorce, as in any manner negating the continuation of the
underlying agreement.

In Brownstein v.

Brownstein,35 another court

carried this reasoning one step further and refused to honor an express
30. 16 App. Div. 2d 423, 229 N.y.s.2d 61 (2d Dep't 1962).
31. 229 N.Y.S.2d 904 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1962).
32. 2 N.Y.2d 668, 143 N.E.2d 10, 163 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1957).
33.4 N.Y.2d 1I3, 149 N.E.2d 326, 172 N.Y.S.2d 805 (1958).
34. Cohen v. Cohen, 28 Misc. 2d 558, 212 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct., Bronx Co. 1961).
35. 34 Misc. 2d 1097, 229 N.Y.S.2d 463 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1962).
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provision in the separation agreement allo'wing an action for separation.36
While the Borax decision is probably necessary in order to validate the
contractual terms of the agreement, which might othenvise be subject to
repudiation at the parties' whims, it is not clear why the same result
should apply in circumstances in which the signatories expressly refused
to limit themselves to the negotiated terms, presumably because of a
wariness concerning the arrangement.37
The Hartigans, who have already made a major contribution to
national domestic relations law,3s also contributed to proving the longevity
of separation agreements. Despite a five-year hiatus in the operation of a
5eparation agreement, which had, apparently, been superseded by a divorce
decree, a court ruled that merger of the separation agreement did not
occur and that it was consequently valid and subsisting when the inter
vening divorce was invalidated.39

Of course, where the parties expressly

contract to terminate the support provisions of an agreement on a given
date, expressly leaving the wife such judicial remedy as is available, the
remaining sections, whether they still constitute a "separate agreement"
or not, are a bar to a separation action.40
The question remains: what is the status of the remaining terms of an
agreement where the support provisions have been terminated by con
tractual agreement or judicial intervention? When a separation agreement
has been invalidated for contravention of Section

51

of the Domestic

Relations Law, as relieving the husband of his duty to support his wife,
courts have, despite this fact, enforced releases and waivers contained in
the agreement.41 When the judicial invalidation is attributable to another
portion of section

51,

which prohibits a contract to alter or dissolve a

marriage, no previously reported case appears to have enforced any provi
sions of the agreement. The first department, however, by a three-to-two
vote, has now ruled that mutual waivers of the right to share in the
estate of the other spouse survive a separation agreement otherwise nullified
as a contract to invalidate a marriage. The analogy made by the court
to the duty of support cases seems strained. In the cases in which the
courts found the husband remiss in the measure of support, they have
excised the support provisions, substituted their

own

judgment

and

determined the fairness of the old provisions in the new context. Ultimate
36. "Nothing in this agreement shall bar the institution of any action for separation
by either party." Id. at 1098, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 464.
37. But see Stoddard Y. Stoddard, 227 N.Y. 13, 124 N.E. 90 (1919) (refusing to en
furce contractual provision for redetermination of support payments); Carluccio Y. Car
luccio, 22 Misc. 2d 854, 198 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 1960).
38. See Note 21 supra and accompanying text.
:m. Hartigan Y. Hartigan, 30 Misc. 2d 949, 219 N.Y.S.2d 92 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1961),
mudified on other grounds, 16 App. Div. 2d 145, 226 N.Y.S.2d 31 (1st Dep't 1962).
40. Stampler Y. Stampler, 224 N.Y.S.2d 185 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1961).
41. Schiff v. Schiff, 270 App. Div. 845, 60 N.Y.S.2d 318 (2d Dep't 1946); Hoops v.
Hoops, 266 App. Div. 512, 42 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1st Dep't 1943).
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fairness to the wife was all that had to be accomplished. In the contract
to-tenninate-a-marriage cases, such as the one now considered, however.
the reason for invalidation differs. The contract is unenforceable because
the underlying consideration is unlawful.

No readjustment of financial

provisions can transform it into a mere contract for support.

Indeed, on

the instant facts, a strong case can be made for the dissent's suggestion
that, even accepting the majority's rule, the waivers enforced should not
have survived on contract principles.
It has long been settled in this state42 that willful breach of visitation
privileges by VV suspends H's contractual duty of support. The policy is
apparently salutary.

Indeed, within this year one court has indicated

reluctance in applying the provisions of an Arizona judgment where
there had allegedly been a willful denial of visitation rights, despite its
recognition of a rule requiring independent application of the support
based judgment.43 Feeling constrained by prior decisions, the court none
theless enforced the foreign judgment.44

It is apparently error, however,

for a court to condition support payments on visitation privileges where
the children themselves resist the visitation.45
In any event, before relying on the terms of a separation agreement
relating to visitation rights as a justification for the suspension of support
payments, one would be well advised to scrutinize the agreement in ques
tion. In Kuniholm v. Kuniholm,46 the Court of Appeals rejected the deci
sions of special term and the Appellate Division, First Department, that
a question of fact existed with respect to the visitation provisions of the
separation agreement.

The agreement in question

provided that

H's

infant children should not be removed from the continental United States
and, in addition, that H should have the right to visit the children at
mutually agreeable times and specifically during Easter, Christmas, and
for two weeks during the summer. W's daughter accompanied her on a
two-year foreign assignment. H subsequently defended an action to recover
support

payments

on

several

grounds, including

breach

of

visitation

rights. The Court of Appeals held that no question of fact existed, the
daughter not having been "permanently" removed and the rights

to

visitation having remained unaffected. A number of factors suggest that
the Court of Appeals reached the appropriate result in this case.

wife had sought pemission; her letters were ignored.

The

At the time the

agreement was signed, the wife was apparently already employed in the
occupation which led to her overseas assignment.

The daughter alleged

that she had taken the matter up with her father and he had indicated
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Duryea v. Bliven, 122 N.Y. 567, 25 N.E. 908 (1890).
Lynde v. Lynde, 162 N.Y. 405, 56 N.E. 979 (1900), ali'd, 181 U.S. 18!! (1901).
Greene v. Greene, 31 Misc. 2d 1009, 221 N.Y.S.2d 236 (Sup. Ct., Monroe Co. 1961).
Babin v. Babin, 16 App. Div. 2d 884, 228 N.Y.S.2d 434 (4th Dep't 1962).
II N.Y.2d 358, 183 N.E.2d 692, 229 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1962).
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no OppOSItIOn.

The disturbing aspect of the OpInIOn, however, is the

court's suggestion that the result follows from the agreement. The court
found that the voluntary trip by the twenty-year-old girl for a two-year
period was not a permanent removal from the United States, without
making it clear whether this result followed from the girl's maturity, the
voluntary nature of the trip, or the temporary nature of a two-year period.
More disturbing is the suggestion that, in any event, a trip abroad would
not interfere with the husband's "right of visitation,"47 thereby seemingly
suggesting that a right of visitation is available irrespective of its geo
graphical impracticability.
The importance of good draftsmanship in separation agreements was
also suggested by the decision in Taus v. Taus48 where the court held that
an agreement to pay $70 per week for support of the wife and children
during their minority committed H to pay $70 per week after the children
attained majority since no reduced payment was specifically provided for
such an event.

Alimon)I .-Alimony criteria have undergone some refinement in the
past year. In Newburger v. Newburger,49 the court held that the applicable
level of support in annulment cases differs from the support standard
to be applied following divorce or separation.

\<\Tithout articulating the

new standard to be applied, the court appears to have sought the middle
ground between the level of preseparation living and the wife's premarital
"menial income," reasoning that it would not be justified in awarding
alimony on the divorce or separation standards, there being neither proof
of fault nor a continuing marital relationship to which such standard
would relate. Since H in this case obtained the annulment from W be
cause of fault on her part, the result is not harsh. \<\Tere the roles reversed,
however, the suggestion of the court that the standard would be less than the
preseparation standard since there had never been a valid marriage, would
seem undesirable.
Another case suggested that the preseparation standard may be in
adequate as a gauge of the level of alimony, even where it is substantially
above the level required to keep the wife from becoming a public charge.
In Hunter v. HunterGO the court found that both husband and wife had
diligently applied themselves to H's career and he had, at the pinnacle
of his success, left his spouse for another. Under these circumstances, the
court held the wife entitled to share in the standard the couple would
have achieved considering his potential future earnings. However salutary
such a rule may be, especially under the facts of the Hunter case where
47. Emphasis added by the court. Id. at 361, 183 N.E.2d at 695, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 415.
48. 35 Misc. 2d 396, 229 N.Y.S.2d 124 (Sup. Ct., App. T., 1st Dep't 1962). •
49. 228 N.Y.S.2d 323 (&up. Ct., Westch. Co. 1961).
50. 30 Misc. 2d 776, 216 N.Y.S.2d 711 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1961), aff'd, 15 App. Diy. 2d
821, 226 N.Y.S.2d 675 (1st Dep't 1962).
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the marriage lasted nineteen years, it is questionable whether the standard
described was actually applied. The alimony awarded was $20,000 per
annum, but even this generous amount could be justified on the income at
the time of separation (which, according to court figures, was slightly less
than $84,000) and need not relate to H's income at the time of trial (over
$111,000). Of course, the standard is easier to articulate than to apply.
The wrangling over appropriate amounts for temporary and perma·
nent alimony continues unabated in the courts. This year, as in the past.
appellate courts have been required to review alimony awards and the
review has turned up startling results. In iliack v. Mack,rJ1 the fourth
department reversed alimony payments of $24,000 plus additional benefits
to be paid by a husband whose income after taxes was $25,000.
At least one voice has been raised against the extent of appeal allowed
on temporary alimony awards. Justice Eager, dissenting in Wexler v.
Wexler,1;2 would refuse to consider the sufficiency of temporary alimony
awards if there were some support for the determination below and would
utilize speedy trial rather than appeal as a method of vindicating the
parties' rights.
III
CHILDREN

Adoption.-May a foster parent abrogate an adoption because of his
inability to support his adopted child? This issue was raised in Matter of
Anonymous.53 After ruling against allegations of fraud in the initial adop
tion proceeding, the court held that the statutory grounds in Section I 17
of the Domestic Relations Law;;4 which allow a foster child "or any person"
on "behalf of such child" to abrogate on several grounds, among them:
"inability or refusal to support, maintain, or educate the child," were
designed exclusively for the benefit of the child and could not be invoked
by the foster parent. The decision is a salutary recognition of the perma
nence of foster parental relations.
Custody.-In the child custody cases, the major problem remains the
reneging parent. Although both the Social Welfare Law and Domestic
Relations Law provide expressly for waiving parental consent to the place
ment of children where the children have been "abandoned,"i)o abandon
ment continues to be an elusive concept with the odds strongly in favor of
the natural parent. In Matter of Lewis,56 the court refused to commit two
children to a welfare agency under Section 384 of the Social 'Welfare Law.
although both had been placed with the Department of 'Welfare on birth
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

16 App. Div. 2d 1029, 230 N.Y.S.2d 112 (4th Dep't 1962).
15 App. Div. 2d 451, 221 N.Y.S.2d 737 (1st Dep't 1961).
29 Misc. 2d 580, 213 N.Y.S.2d 10 (SUIT. Ct., Nassau Co. 1961).
Now N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law § 1I8-a.
N.Y. Soc. Welfare Law § 884-e; N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law § Ill.
35 Misc. 2d 117, 230 N.Y.S.2d 481 (SUIT. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1962).
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and had remained under foster care for four and three years respectively.
The decision negated abandonment by the mother who had apparently
not visited either child more than three times, the last visit in both cases
being two years prior to the institution of the action in question. The
court suggested that the mother's lack of visitation was in part due to
active interference by the welfare agency and that other factors explained
her absence.

Finally, the court concluded that the appropriate abandon

ment standard requires a willfulness which must be more than neglect
caused by illness due to temporary mental disturbance.

What is most

llbturbing about the case is that it seems reasonably evident that the
mother was not seeking custody of the children but was merely seeking
to prevent placing the children for adoption.

Indeed, the court charac

terized her as "emotionally and perhaps mentally disturbed.";;7 If abandon
ment requires more than temporary emotional disturbance and if emotional
disturbance of over five years, as in this case, is temporary, one wonders
under what circumstances the cllild of a person mentally ill could ever find
a permanent home.

The Court of Appeals in Isaac v. GreenbergaS also

refused to find abandonment in the father's placement of his daughter
with his mother and grandmother for a period of over six years while he
�erved in the Navy. Only Judge Van Voorhis seemed shocked at the effect
on the daughter.
Abandonment was, however, found in one Court of Appeals case.59
In that case the mother gave her four-day-old child to foster parents, via
an intermediary. For the next three years she made no inquiries as to his
whereabouts.

Under these circumstances,

a divided Court of Appeals

found her to have abandoned her child. The judges who concurred in the
opinion of the court may have been somewhat persuaded by the resolution
of the other issue in the case, the fitness of the mother to raise the child.
On the fitness issue, the court found that the foster parents had proven
the mother's "sexual promiscuity at the age of

16

13

and ...indulgence at

in both normal and abnormal sex relations with a married man over

"60 Even
a period of several months while separated from her husband. .. .
on these facts, however, only a bare majority of the court could be mustered
for permanently depriving the mother of her child.

Two judges, in a

concurring opinion, suggested that if the mother would mend her ways,
she should later be allowed to institute new proceedings for custody. Chief
Judge Desmond would have given her immediate custody of the child.
It is, of course, difficult to accommodate the right of a natural parent
to his child and the policy of protecting the child's welfare.
37.
58.
:;9.
60.

One com-

Itl. at 119, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 483.
11 N.Y.2d 869, 183 N.E.2d 290, 227 N.Y.S.2d 683 (1962).
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 10 N.Y.2d 332, 179 N.E.2d 200, 222 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1961).
Id. at 336, 179 N.E.2d at 201, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 947.
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promise is suggested by Laub v. CaltobeZotia61 in which the court expressly
refused to find abandonment in a case in which the child had been left
with grandparents for almost all of his twelve years and granted custody
to the mother on condition that the infant continue to reside with the
grandparents.

Custody hearings: off-the-record information.-The use of reports by
courts in custody cases, when those reports have not been shown to the
attorneys, continues as a problem. In Matter of Zebo,62 the fourth depart
ment, over a strong dissent by Presiding Justice Williams, affirmed a case
in which the trial court had studied a probation department report that
had not been shown to the attorneys. The next day the Court of Appeals
reversed the authority primarily relied on by the appellant in Zebo by
deciding Kesseler v. KesseZer.63

In KesseZer, Judge Van Voorhis, writing

for the majority, addressed himself to a resolution of the major problems
respecting the use of confidential information by the court.

Specifically,

it was held that the confidential use of psychiatric reports, without stipula
tion of the parties, was reversible error despite the fact that the appellate
division had found that the record fully supported the judgment without
reference to the objectionable material. On the other hand, insofar as the
parties had stipulated to the submission of a report by the family counselor
attached to the court, no error had been committed in refusing to show
the report to the parties.

The rule appears to be a clear one: without

stipulation of the parties, the judge is not entitled, in custody proceedings,
to use information obtained by means incompatible with the adversary
process. Where the parties are willing to agree to exceptions, for example,
a private interview between the judge and the child or the confidential use
of professional reports, the reception of the resulting information is entirely
proper although the parties have not been apprised of its content. The court
did suggest that, even absent stipulation, a trial court might call upon
qualified experts to examine the infant and consenting parents. The court
appointed expert would then be available to either party. Calling of such
an expert appears to exhaust the court's power to take independent means
of acquiring information. Judge Van Voorhis' lucid opinion should go far
in resolving any remaining doubt concerning independent judicial inquiry
in custody cases. The later memorandum affirmance of Zebo indicates, how
ever, that it is not as yet reversible error for a judge to receive non-evi·
dentiary reports confidentially where only reception has been stipulated.

Children's Rights and Status.-In the matter of parent-child suits, the
trend continues in the direction of the Badigian case64 criticized in last
61. 33 Misc. 2d 397, 219 N.Y.S.2d 363 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1961).
62. 15 App. Div. 2d 726, 223 N.Y.S.2d 227 (4th Dep't), alI'd, 11 N.Y.2d 771, 181
N.E.2d 766, 227 N.Y.S.2d 22 (l962).
63. 10 N.Y.2d 445, 180 N.E.2d 402, 225 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1962).
64. Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 174 N.E.2d 718, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1961).
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year's survey.6� In St. Croix v. St. Croix66 the appellate division reversed
the trial court determination that, as a matter of law, a child who had been
removed from his parental home by order of the children's court (although
he resided with his parents from time to time by permission) was emanci
pated and could, consequently, recover damages from a parent for negligent
injury. If an infant stands a poor chance of recovery against a parent for
accidental injury, at least a tort recovery seems barred from seizure by the
Director of Public 'Welfare for use in support of the infant or his parents.67
Admitting the applicability of Sections 101 and 104 of the Social Welfare
Law, which make an infant liable under some circumstances for his parents'
support, a court, in so concluding, relied on a line of cases suggesting the
sanctity of personal injury recoveries.

It is difficult to quarrel with the

proposition that a crippled infant may be more in need of the money at his
majority than the public treasury.
As to the status of children born of void marriages, a case of first im
pression has allowed a surrogate to legitimatize a child of a void marriage
when the marriage was held void as an incident to probate proceedings
in the surrogate's court.68 While Section 1135 of the Civil Practice Act ex·
pressly grants the power to legitimatize children of a void marriage only
in connection with annulment actions, the court reasoned that an an
nulment action would be impossible because of the death of one of the
parties.6� In light of the social policy favoring legitimization it held the
surrogate's action proper. As a matter of statutory interpretation, the result
may be doubted; as a matter of public policy, it seems unimpeachable.
IV
MISCELLANEA
A ta.xpayer who had left his wife and thereafter defeated her action
for separation in this state, has been excluded from the "head of house
hold" category of Section 1(2)(b) of the Internal Revenue Code.7o "What
ever else his status, he is not a person "legally separated from his spouse
under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance" and consequently must
pay income ta.x as a single person.71 It should also be noted that whatever
demerit there is to a meritricious relationship does not carry over into
insurance law. In United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Cruzp the lady in question,
65. Goebel &: Rashap, Family Law, 1961 Survey of N.Y. Law, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1549,
1559 (1961).
66. 17 App. Div. 2d 692, 229 N.Y.S.2d 969 (4th Dep't 1962).
67. Woods v. Mason, 32 Misc. 2d 745, 222 N.y.s.2d 903 (Sup. Ct., Onondaga Co. 1961).
68. Matter of Newins, 16 App. Div. 2d 436, 229 N.Y.s.2d 279 (2d Dep't 1962).
69. It is not clear why annulment could not be declared posthumously under N.Y.
Civ. Prac. Act § 1139 unles the "wife" of the void marriage had knowledge of the prior
marriage.
7Q. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1(2)(B).
71. Wesemann v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 527 (2d Cir. 1962).
72. 35 Mise. 2d 272, 230 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1962).

HeinOnline -- 14 Syracuse L. Rev. 343 1962-1963

344

SYRACUSE LAW REVIEW

who lived with and had children by a man without the benefit of marriage,
collected on an insurance policy which would have been unavailable to a
wife because of Section

167(3)

of the Insurance Law.73 Since she was not "a

spouse" of the insured within the meaning of the statute, the insurer was
held liable. The parties considered themselves husband and wife, and
would, but for the abolition of common-law marriage,74 probably have
been held to be spouses. The opposite result in Cruz would seem permissi
ble as a matter of statutory interpretation and certainly permissible from
the standpoint of probable legislative intent. Since insurers are likely to
close the gap created by this case, it will probably be relegated to a con
versation piece.

New Legisla tion.

The

-

only legislative change of general applicability

is the establishment, effective September I of this year, of a state family
court, in accordance with the Family Court Act.75 Rules applicable to the
state-wide family court have been issued by the Administrative Board of
the Judicial Conference. The Family Court Act is designed to give a single
court (the family court) jurisdiction over related matters of family life en
compassing

most

intrafamilial

legal

problems

except

separations,

an

nulments and divorce (which are reserved to the supreme court). In mat
ters of neglect, support, paternity, family offenses and juvenile proceedings,
the jurisdiction of the court is exclusive.76 In adoption, its jurisdiction will
become exclusive on September

1, 1964,

being until that time concurrent

with the surrogate's court.77
A few provisions appear especially worthy of note. The first relates to
law guardians78 which are established to assist minors in neglect proceed
ings, juvenile delinquency proceedings, and proceedings to determine the
need of supervision of minors. In addition, Section

241

contains the salu

tary provision declaring the right to counsel for minors in these proceed
ings. Because of the suggested permissibility of utilizing the Legal Aid So
ciety as law guardian,79 a number of such societies will presumably become
significantly involved in the application of the new act. Certain to cause
more difficulty are two other parts of the act. One of them deals with con
ciliation proceedings80 over which the court has original jurisdiction. Sec
tions

924

and

925

allow a court, after hearing, to order parties to attend

reconciliation proceedings. Section

926

terminates such proceedings, except

on consent of both spouses, after ninety days. It is not clear whether, at the
73. "No policy . . . shall be deemed to insure against any liability of an insured
because of death of or injuries to his ... spouse [unless the contract expressly provides
otherwise]." N.Y. Ins. Law § 167(3).
74. N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law § II.
75. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, chs. 686, 687, 700, 702, and 703.
76. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 115.
77. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 64I.
78. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 241-49.
79. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 243.
80. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 911-26.
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end of that time, a new petition may be brought. There will, no doubt, be
difficulty in effectuating the conciliation proceeding.

The parties, forced

to confer, may be hostile to the proceedings. Time lost in attendance may
make conferences an effective sanction against errant husbands. It will
take time for the court to accustom itself to the procedure and to work
out the necessary accommodation with the probation service and the volun
tary agencies which are to handle the proceedings. All this notwithstanding,

if the availability of this procedure diverts claims which would othenvise be
brought in criminal courts, if it relieves enough marital pressure to save
some marriages and, especially, if it really reconciles spouses, the procedure
will fill a distinct present void.
The other part, considerably broader in scope, is Section

251

which ex

pressly permits the court, once a petition has been filed under this act,
to order "any person within its jurisdiction" to be examined by a physician,
psychiatrist or psychologist "when such an examination will serve the
purposes of the act," and continues by providing that the court may re
mand the person for a maximum of thirty days for purposes of such physi
cal or psychiatric study. That a provision so broadly drafted, allowing
commitment and examination of so vaguely described a category of people,
will escape constitutional attack seems unlikely.
No less novel, if apparently more constitutional, is the transfer of
jurisdiction over several criminal provisions to the family court under
Article

8,

Family Offenses Proceedings.s1 Under these provisions, criminal

acts between spouses and between other members of the family "which
would constitute disorderly conduct or an assault" may be brought in
proceedings in the family court.82 Functional integration of family prob
lems seems a desirable aim.
81. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 8II·16.
82. People v. Klaff, 231 N.Y.S.2d 875, 35 Misc. 2d 859 (1962), held: only misdemeanor
assaults transferred to Family Cts.-court denied transfer of felony assault.
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